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I. Introduction 
The recent National Research Council (NRC) rankings of doctoral 
programs in the arts, humanities, biological sciences, engineering, physical 
sciences and mathematics, and social and behavioral sciences has drawn 
considerable public attention.1 Because it is the first major assessment of doctoral 
education undertaken in over a decade, its findings have been highlighted in the 
national media.2 The study will undoubtedly be used by potential graduate 
students making application and acceptance decisions and by university 
administrators making resource allocation decisions. Thus, the study will 
influence, sometimes positively and sometimes negatively, doctoral programs at 
universities across the nation. 
These rankings were obtained from a survey of over 16,700 graduate 
faculty members who were asked to rate each PhD program in their discipline on 
a scale of 0 (not sufficient for doctoral education) to 5 (distinguished). Each rater 
was provided with lists of the faculty members associated with each of 50 
randomly chosen programs in the discipline and the number of new doctorates 
produced by each of the programs over the previous five-year period. Raters 
were asked to rate both the scholarly quality of each program's faculty and each 
program's effectiveness. The response rate to the survey was about 50 percent 
and the programs in each discipline were rated by at least 200 faculty members. 
The NRC also collected a set of objective statistics about the seniority, 
research productivity, and productivity in producing doctoral degrees of 
program faculty. These data were not provided to raters. If one assumes, 
however, that raters were sufficiently knowledgeable about their profession that 
in making their ratings they acted as if they knew the objective measures, then 
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one can use multivariate regression models to estimate the extent to which 
variations in the objective measures influence raters' decisions. That is, one can 
estimate hedonic models of the determinants of departmental ratings.3 The 
resulting estimates can then be used to help guide resource allocation decisions 
at universities. 
Why does one need such estimates? After all, the published NRC volume 
presented simple correlations between some of the objective measures and the 
subjective ratings of the raters. For example, program size, as measured either by 
the number of faculty associated with the program or the number of doctoral 
degrees granted by the program over the past five years, was shown to be 
positively correlated with the subjective ratings in most fields. However, when 
the objective measures are themselves correlated, as faculty size and degrees 
granted are, simple correlations do not permit one to learn the partial correlation 
of each objective variable with the subjective ratings. For example, they do not 
provide information about whether increasing faculty size, while holding 
constant the number of degrees granted, would be associated with a higher 
subjective rating. To answer such a question requires a multivariate analysis. 
In this paper, we describe how one can use multivariate regression models 
and the NRC data to analyze how measures of program size, faculty seniority, 
faculty research productivity, and faculty productivity in producing doctoral 
degrees influence raters' subjective ratings of doctoral programs in various 
academic fields. Using data for one of the fields, economics, we then indicate 
how university administrators can use the models to compute what the impact of 
adding one faculty position would be on the ranking of an economics 
department. The department chosen to illustrate the methodology is the Cornell 
economics department in which one of us has an appointment. Finally, we 
illustrate how administrators can "decompose" the differences between a 
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department's rating and the ratings of a group of higher rated departments in the 
field into differences due to faculty size, faculty seniority, faculty research 
productivity, and faculty productivity in producing new doctorates. To illustrate 
the methodology we use the Cornell economics department and choose the top 
ten economics programs as the comparison group. This decomposition suggests 
the type of questions that the department and university should be addressing if 
they are serious about wanting to improve the department's ranking. 
The methodology that we describe in the next section, statistically relating 
an outcome (in this case the subjective rating) to a set of objective measures and 
then inferring the effect of a change in any of the latter on the outcome, has a 
long tradition in economics. As noted above, it is commonly referred to as the 
"hedonic function" or "implicit price" approach. Implicit in the approach is the 
assumption that one can infer causality from such cross-section estimates. While 
there are other methodological approaches that are more appropriate for trying 
to infer causality when longitudinal or panel data are available, in the absence of 
these types of data we are restricted to the approach presented here. Hence, in 
what follows, we will assume in places that we can infer how a given change in 
any one of the objective measures would quantitatively influence a program's 
subjective rating. Readers unhappy with this assumption can view our work as 
purely descriptive. 
n. Methodology 
Table 1 presents data for Cornell University's doctoral program in 
economics on its scholarly quality of program faculty rating and some of the 
objective measures collected by the NRC. On a scale of 0 to 5, the mean rating of 
Cornell's economics department in terms of scholarly quality of the faculty was 
3.56 in 1993 which ranked it as the 18th best department in the nation. 
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Economics is also one of Cornell's lower ranked doctoral programs, as most of 
Cornell's humanities, engineering, and physical science programs are ranked in 
the top ten nationwide in their fields.4 Cornell's economics program faculty 
members also made it only the 29th largest economics department. 
The other variables displayed in table 1 are not always in the form 
collected and presented by the NRC5. Rather, some have been transformed to 
reduce multicollinearity (correlations among the objective variables) in the 
analyses that follow. For example, rather than listing the number of doctoral 
degrees granted by the field during the previous five years, which is highly 
correlated across programs with faculty size, we list doctoral degrees granted per 
faculty member during the previous five years. These transformations have been 
made because high levels of multicollinearity lead to large standard errors and 
imprecise coefficient estimates. 
With data on these variables in table 1 for each doctoral program in each 
field, one can estimate for each field models of the form: 
8 
(1) R l=a0+a,F1 + a2Fl2 + Xa jx„ + e, 
i-3 
Here Ri is the rating of the scholarly quality of the faculty at institution i; Fj is the 
number of faculty associated with the doctoral program at institution i, the xji are 
the other objective characteristics assumed to influence program ratings (to be 
discussed shortly), ei is a random error term, and the aj are the parameters to be 
estimated.6 
The estimated values of these parameters provide estimates of the 
marginal impact of a one-unit change in each objective variable on the subjective 
rating the doctoral program received, holding constant all other variables. The 
squared faculty size variable permits the relationship between rating and faculty 
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size to be nonlinear. In particular, the marginal effect of an increase in faculty 
size by one on the faculty program rating, holding all the other variables in the 
model constant, is given by 
(2) ai + 2a2Fi. 
As a result, if ai proves to be positive and &2 proves to be negative, as 
faculty size increases the program rating will first increase, but at a declining 
marginal rate. The rating will eventually reach a maximum at a faculty size 
equal to minus ai /2a2. Finally, the rating will decline as program size continues 
to increase beyond this faculty size. 
The other variables (the x's) included in the analyses are the percentage of 
full professors (FULL), the percentage of program faculty with external research 
support (RESEARCH), publications per faculty member (PUBFAC), a measure of 
the dispersion of publications per faculty member, the GINI coefficient for 
publications per faculty member (GEMIPUB), the number of citations per faculty 
publication (CITEPUB), the number of PhD degrees granted per faculty member 
(PHDFAC), the number of PhDs granted per enrolled graduate student 
(PHDSTU) and the median number of years that it took new doctorates to receive 
their degrees (MEDTIME).7 Publication data were not collected by the NRC for 
faculty in the arts and humanities. Hence, for these fields PUBFAC, GINIPUB, 
and CITPUB do not appear in the analyses. Instead, the NRC collected data for 
these fields on the total number of prestigious awards and honors won per 
faculty member (AWARDF), and this variable is included in the models for these 
fields. Implicit in the set of variables included in the model is the belief that the 
raters subjective ratings of a program are determined by the program's size, the 
seniority distribution of its faculty, its faculty members' research productivity, 
and their doctoral production productivity. 
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HI. Empirical Estimates 
The estimated regression coefficients for each field that we obtained are 
found in tables 2A to 2E.8 In all fields but one, there is a positive relationship 
between program rating and faculty size (FACULTY). However, typically, the 
coefficient of the square of faculty size (FACULTY2) is negative, implying that 
after some faculty size, further growth has a negative effect on ratings.9 In most 
fields (but not in the majority of the biological sciences), increases in the 
proportion of faculty who are full professors (FULL) leads to higher ratings, 
presumably because cumulative accomplishments and name recognition are 
higher for full professors. 
The three measures of faculty research productivity (RESEARCH, 
PUBFAC, CITPUB), all tend to be positively associated with the subjective 
ratings. In contrast, the dispersion in faculty productivity, GINIPUB, is 
statistically significantly negatively associated with ratings in the majority of 
fields. Since an increase in GINIPUB means an increase in dispersion, this 
implies that hiring both a "star" and a "lemon" whose average productivity is the 
same as that of existing faculty may decrease program ratings in these fields! In 
the arts and the humanities, the objective measure of faculty productivity 
(AWARDF) also is positively associated with the subjective ratings. 
Measures of doctoral program success also matter. In about two-thirds of 
the fields, the greater the number of doctoral degrees produced per faculty 
member (PHDFAC), the higher the ratings tend to be. This implies that 
increasing the number of faculty associated with a program, without also 
increasing the number of degrees granted, will indirectly have a negative effect 
on program ratings in these fields. Finally, longer median times to degree 
(MEDTTME), which within a field typically are associated with programs with 
less financial support per graduate student, are also associated with more poorly 
6 
rated programs.10 n 
IV. Implications 
We return to the field of economics, and in particular Cornell's program, 
to illustrate how the estimates we obtained may be used to help guide university 
decision-making. As table 3 indicates, Cornell's economics program included 30 
faculty in 1993 while the average program size of the top ten departments in 
economics was 38 that year. Not unexpectedly, the Cornell department has 
argued over the years that it needs more faculty positions if it is to improve its 
ranking. Faced with tight budgets, the institution as a whole alternatively 
wonders how much the department would be hurt if it lost a position. 
One can, in fact, conduct simulations of what the impacts of increasing, or 
decreasing, the faculty resources devoted to the Cornell economics program by 
one faculty member, all other variables held constant (including PhDs produced 
per faculty member) would be on Cornell's ranking in the field. The answers to 
these questions depend upon the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients of 
faculty size and faculty size squared, and the number of faculty currently 
associated with the program, which together through the expression in (2) 
determine what the change in Cornell's absolute rating would be predicted to be. 
How tightly bunched the ratings of other programs are around the Cornell 
program then determines how this change would translate into a change in the 
Cornell program's relative ranking. 
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When these simulations were conducted, they indicated that Cornell 
economics would improve its relative rank by one if it received an additional 
faculty line and would similarly reduce its relative rank by one if it lost a 
position.12 These simulations assume, of course, that all of the other 
"explanatory" variables in the model would remain unchanged. If any of them 
would change as a result of a change in faculty size, the impact of these changes 
would have to be included in the simulations. 
For example, if the number of PhDs granted per faculty member declined 
when faculty size increased because there was no increase in support for 
graduate students, this indirect negative impact would also have to be included 
in the computation of the change in the ranking. 
It should also be noted that larger changes in faculty size will not 
necessarily lead to simulated proportionately larger changes in a department's 
relative ranking. This is because the predicted change in the ranking depends 
both on the predicted change in the rating and the number of schools whose 
ratings are "closely bunched" around the department. Unless the distribution of 
program ratings is uniformly distributed, the change in a program's ranking will 
not necessarily be proportionate to the change in its rating. 
The estimated coefficients for economics can also be used to estimate what 
percentage of the difference between the average absolute rating of the top ten 
economics departments and Cornell's economics department absolute rating can 
be "explained" by each of the variables in the model. Given the estimated 
a R 
coefficients J for a field, the predicted absolute rating of Cornell's program, « , 
is given by 
8 
R ^ a o + a ^ + a ^ + ^ajXj, 
(3) f'3 
Similarly, given the means of the characteristics of the top ten schools, the 
8 
predicted absolute rating for the mean of the top ten schools, m , is given by 
8 
Rm = a0 + a iFm + a2Fm2 + £a j X j m 
(4) i-3 
Here the subscripts c and m refer to the values for Cornell and the mean of the 
top ten schools, respectively, of each of the variables. 
The predicted absolute difference in the rating of Cornell and of the mean 
of the top ten schools that is due to differences in faculty size is thus given by 
(5a) a,(Fm-Fe) + aa(Fm2-Fe2).i3 
Similarly, the predicted absolute difference due to differences in any of the other 
explanatory variables is given by 
(5b) a ^ - X j , ) j = 3,4,...8. 
To obtain an estimate of the percentage of the actual difference that is "due" to 
each explanatory variable, one simply divides the estimates from (5a) or (5b) by 
the actual observed difference, Rm - Re, and then multiplies the result by one 
hundred. The percentage of the actual difference that is due to all of the 
explanatory remarks is obtained by summing the percentages due to each 
variable. 
The estimates obtained from performing such calculations for the Cornell 
field of economics are summarized in rows 16 and 17 of table 3. Row 17 indicates 
that 87 percent of the difference between the average rating of the top ten 
programs in economics and the Cornell economics department's program rating 
is explained by all of the variables in the model. 
Row 16 indicates how this explained percentage can be divided across sets 
of explanatory variables. About one-third, or 28 percent, is due to Cornell's 
having a smaller faculty size than the average top ten program. 37 percent is due 
to Cornell's economists having lower research productivity than the economists 
at the top ten programs, as measured by the percentage of faculty with research 
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grants, publications per faculty member and citations per publication. Finally, 23 
percent is due to Cornell's faculty having lower productivity in doctoral student 
production, as measured by fewer doctoral students produced per faculty 
member and longer times-to-degree per student. Crucially, although a smaller 
faculty size is one of the contributing factors to Cornell's not being ranked among 
the top ten economics departments, it is not the major factor. Rather, the major 
factor is the lower research productivity of its faculty. 
The fact that Cornell's economists' research productivity, as measured 
primarily by publications per faculty member and citations per publication, is 
lower on average than the research productivity of faculty at the top ten 
economics programs should of course be of concern to the university. Does it 
reflect an inability to attract the very best young scholars? Does it reflect that 
Cornell's faculty in economics spend more time on teaching and less time on 
research than their colleagues do at the top ten competitor institutions? Does it 
reflect a propensity by Cornell to promote a much higher proportion of assistant 
professors than its competitors in economics, and thus the need to revise tenure 
standards? If it is a failure of Cornell to attract the very best faculty in economics, 
is this because of the relatively low level of salaries that Cornell pays its senior 
faculty or because of its unwillingness to pay a compensating wage differential to 
attract top faculty to relatively weaker departments in the University such as 
economics?14 A university interested in improving the ranking of a department 
needs to know the answers to such questions. 
10 
FOOTNOTES 
1. Marvin L. Goldberger, Brendan A. Maher, and Pamela Ebert Flattau eds 
Research Doctorate Programs in the United States: Continuity and Change. 
National Academy Press. Washington DC: 1995. 
2. See, for example, Denise K. Magner "Doctoral Judgements: A Sweeping 
National Study Assesses the Quality of Research Programs in 41 Fields"; 
Chronicle of Higher Education. September 22,1995, A20-A30., 
William Honan "Study of Graduate Programs Serves up Several Surprises", 
New York Times 44(September 13,1995): Al, and Amy Wallace "UC Berkeley 
Ranked First in PhD Programs", Los Angeles Times 114 (September 13,1995): 
Al. 
3. See Sherwin Rosen "Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets", Tournal of Political 
Economy 82 (Jan/Feb 1974): 34-55. 
4. In what follows, our focus is on the scholarly quality of the faculty rating. 
Similar analyses to those described here could obviously be done for the 
program effectiveness rating. Potential students and university 
administrators presumably use both ratings in their decision calculus. 
5. The raw data for each school for each field are found in Appendix tables J, K, 
L, M, and N of Goldberger et al. (1995). They are also available in the form of 
EXCEL spreadsheets from The National Research Coundl's World Wide Web 
site, from which they can be downloaded. 
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6. The quality of program faculty variable, Ri, can only vary between 0 and 5. 
Since the linear model in equation (1) places no such restrictions on the 
predicted value of the outcomes, it is clearly not formally appropriate. A 
model that avoids the problem of the limited range of Rj is a variant of the 
logit model 
(la) log(Rt / (5 - R,)) = b0 + b,F, + b2F,2 + ^ b ^ + u, 
j-3 
Here one must assume that the error term, ui, is lognormally distributed, and 
log represents the natural logarithm. Note that when Ri equals zero the 
dependent variable in (la) takes on the value of minus infinity, while when Rj 
equals 5, the dependent variable takes on the value of infinity. 
We use equation (1) throughout this paper primarily for expositional 
convenience. It should be viewed only as a linear approximation to the true 
nonlinear model. If one were to seriously consider basing resource allocation 
decisions on the analyses we present in the paper, it would be necessary to 
see how sensitive our results are to the functional form assumptions. In the 
appendix, we provide estimates of (la) for economics and illustrate that our 
specific simulations do not change when this functional form is used. 
7. The GINI coefficient is a measure of dispersion. If all faculty members in a 
program had the same publication level, the GINI coefficient for publications 
per faculty member would be equal to zero for that program. The greater the 
dispersion in publications per faculty member, the higher the GINI coefficient 
will be. For a discussion of how GINI coefficients are calculated, see 
Goldberger et al. (1995), p. 56. 
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8. Estimates were obtained for 35 of the 41 fields. The excluded fields were ones 
in which Cornell had no program. 
9. Models were estimated that both included and excluded the square of faculty 
size as an explanation variable. If the coefficient of the square of the faculty 
size variable did not prove to be statistically significantly different from zero 
at the .10 level (one-tail test), the model that excluded the square of faculty 
size is reported in Table 2. As noted above, the negative coefficient of faculty 
size squared in most fields imply that there is a faculty size in each of those 
fields that maximizes program rating. However, when computed, these sizes 
often are larger than the largest program observed. Given the dangers 
inherent in making projections outside the range of the data observed, we do 
not report these "optimum" program sizes here. 
It may seem strange to talk about significance tests because the observation 
sets typically consisted of all graduate programs in a field, not just a sampling 
of programs. However, the ratings themselves are random variables because 
they come from a sample of raters (typically around 100 per program) and 
thus contain sampling error. 
10. Evidence on the relationship between financial support patterns and time-to-
degrees is found in Ronald G. Ehrenberg and Pangioths Mavros "Do Doctoral 
Students' Financial Support Patterns Affect Their Times-to-Degree and 
Completion Probabilities", Tournal of Human Resources, Summer 1995. 
11. In the few cases that PHDSTU, the ratio of number of doctorates produced 
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during the 1988-1992 period to the number of graduate students enrolled in 
1992, was statistically significantly related to the program ratings, the 
relationship tended to be negative. One interpretation of this finding is that 
larger values of PHDSTU occur when program size has been contracting and 
contracting programs are usually not highly rated. 
12. The quality of faculty ratings for the 16th through 20th ranked programs in 
economics are, respectively, California-Lajolla (3.80), New York University 
(3.62), Cornell (3.56), California Institute of Technology (3.54), and Maryland 
College (3.46). Using expression (2) in the text (the relevant coefficients 
from table 2A, and Cornell's program size of 30 faculty, a change in faculty 
size of one, other factors held constant, would change Cornell's rating by 
.097+30 (-.000953) or about .06. Hence an increase in one faculty position is 
predicted to raise Cornell's rating to about 3.62, moving it into a tie for the 
17th rank with NYU. A loss of one position is predicted to reduce Cornell's 
rating to 350, dropping it below Cal Tech into the 19th rank. Given the 
standard errors associated with each of the regression coefficients, as well as 
the sampling variability in the ratings, such simulations should be viewed as 
only suggestive of what is likely to happen. One should not interpret these 
simulations as implying that we believe faculty resources should be allocated 
primarily based on graduate program ranking. Faculty resource allocation 
decisions clearly should be based on many factors other than graduate 
program rankings, including undergraduate and graduate teaching needs, 
costs of faculty in the various fields, and the perceived relative importance of 
the various fields to the university. 
13. For fields in which faculty size does not appear in quadratic form, the second 
14 
term in (5a) is omitted. 
14. Paradoxical to most noneconomists, is that the weaker a department is, the 
higher the salary that must be paid to talented faculty to attract them to the 
department. Put another way, to the extent that potential faculty value good 
colleagues, the better the department, the lower the salary they should be 
willing to accept. Thus, if market salaries did not differ across fields, one 
should observe a negative correlation between salaries in a field and 
departmental quality within a university. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix table 1 provides estimates of the variant of the logit model 
found in equation (ia) for the field of economics. A comparison of the equations 
for economics found in table 2A and in appendix table 1 indicates that the 
patterns of signs and statistical significance of the coefficients in the two models 
is virtually identical. When the coefficients from appendix table 1 are used in an 
analogous fashion as described in the text and footnote 12 to estimate the impact 
on Cornell's ranking of changing its economics department's size by one, 
identical results to those in the text are obtained. That is, other variables held 
constant, an increase (decrease) of faculty size by one faculty member would 
improve (worsen) the Cornell department's relative ranking by one. 
Appendix table 2 uses the model found in appendix table 1 to partition the 
explained difference between Cornell's program's faculty quality rating and the 
average faculty quality of the top 10 economics programs into percent shares due 
to faculty size, faculty seniority, faculty research productivity, and faculty 
productivity in producing new doctorates. When the logit model is used, 70 
percent of the difference is "explained" by the model. This 70 percent can be 
decomposed into 17 percent due to faculty size, 30 percent due to faculty 
research productivity and 23 percent due to faculty productivity in producing 
new doctorates. Consistent with the results from the linear model reported in the 
text, differences in faculty research productivity between Cornell and the top ten 
schools is again seen to be the most important reason that Cornell's program is 
not rated in the top 10 in terms of faculty quality. 
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Table 1 
1993 NRC Cornell Economics Program Characteristics 
(Cornell rank among institutions) 
Variable 
FACQUAL 
FACULTY 
FULL 
RESEARCH 
PUBFAC 
QNIPUB 
crrpuB 
PHDFAC 
PHDSTU 
MEDTIME 
Economics 
356 (18) 
30 (29) 
70% (13) 
33% (9) 
3.1 (37) 
5.0 (8) 
6.6 (26) 
2.0 (20) 
0.8 (23) 
7.4 (15) 
where: 
FACQUAL Scholarly quality of program faculty (scale of 0 to 5 with 0 denoting 
"Not sufficient for doctoral education" and 5 denoting "Distinguished"). 
FACULTY Total program faculty 
FULL Percentage of faculty who are full professors 
RESEARCH Percentage of faculty with external research support (1986-92) 
PUBFAC Publications per faculty (1988-92) 
GINIPUB Gird coefficient for publications per faculty 
CrrPUB Citations per publication (1988-92) i 
PHDFAC Total PhDs produced (1988-92) divided by the number of faculty 
PHDSTU Total PhDs produced (1988-92) divided by the number of enrolled students in 1992 
MEDTIME Median time to degree 
Source: Marvin L. Goldberger, Brendan A. Maher, and Pamela E. Flattau, eds. Research Doctorate Programs in the United States. 
Washington DC: National Academy Press, 1995. Appendix Tables M 
Table 2A 
1993 NRC Scholarly Quality of Program Faculty Equations: Social and Behavioral Sciences 
(absolute value t statistics) 
Variable/ 
Field 
FACULTY 
FACULTY^ 
FULL 
RESEARCH 
PUBFAC 
GINIPUB 
CTTPUB 
PHDFAC 
PHDSTU 
MEDTIME 
R2 
n 
Anthropology 
.038(52) 
.015(4.7) 
.010(2.6) 
-.048 (0.7) 
-.010(15) 
-.099(1.6) 
231(25) 
-241 (1.0) 
-.111 (4.1) 
.770 
69 
Economics 
.097(5.1) 
-.953(35) 
.002 (05) 
.019 (4.6) 
.204(5.0) 
.000(0.1) 
.108 (35) 
358 (6.4) 
-.083(1.6) 
-.169(5.0) 
£73 
105 
History 
.077(6.9) 
-581 (4.4) 
.010(32) 
-.007 (0.6) 
.626(3.6) 
-.010(2.6) 
.044 (2.0) 
.467(55) 
-.196(3.7) 
-.039(2.4) 
.818 
109 
Political 
Science 
.103(45) 
-.927(2.6) 
.010(2.6) 
.020(3.4) 
.153 (1.8) 
-0)12(24) 
.127(2.7) 
235(35) 
-.051 (02) 
-.069(32) 
£16 
96 
Psychology 
.034 (62) 
-.183(32) 
.007(35) 
.014 (6.6) 
.087(43) 
-.018(72) 
.081 (3.7) 
.004 (03) 
.017(02) 
-.029(1.9) 
£54 
183 
Sociology 
.030(4.0) 
.010(23) 
.016(3.1) 
.114 (1.6) 
-.022(2.4) 
.071(22) 
.464 (3.8) 
-.976(3.4) 
-.069(2.6) 
.670 
95 
Coefficient has been multiplied by 1000 
where: 
FACULTY 
FACULTY2 
FULL 
RESEARCH 
PUBFAC 
GINIPUB 
CITPUB 
PHDFAC 
PHDSTU 
MEDTIME 
Total program faculty 
Total program faculty squared 
Percentage of faculty who are full professors 
Percentage of faculty with external research support (1986-92) 
Publications per faculty (1988-92) 
Gini coefficient for publications per faculty 
Citations per publication (1988-92) 
Total PhDs produced (1988-92) divided by the number of faculty 
Total PhDs produced (1988-92) divided by the number of enrolled students in 1992 
Median time to degree 
Source: Marvin L. Goldberger, Brendan A. Maher, and Pamela E. Flattau, eds. Research Doctorate Programs in the United States. 
Washington DC: National Academy Press, 1995. Appendix Tables M 
Table 2B 
1993 NRC Scholarly Quality of Program Faculty Equations: Biological Sciences 
(absolute value t statistics) 
Field/ 
Variable 
FACULTY 
FACULTY2a 
FULL 
RESEARCH 
PUBFAC 
GINIPUB 
crrpuB 
PHDFAC 
PHDSTU 
MEDTiME 
R2 
n 
Biochem 
and Molec 
.016(33) 
-.056(2.0) 
.004 (1.9) 
.007(3.6) 
.021 (1.6) 
-.026(5.6) 
.087(8.4) 
.120(13) 
.020 (0.2) 
-.011 (03) 
.838 
159 
Cell and 
Developmental 
.012(2.7) 
-.056(2.0) 
.006(2.2) 
.003(1.4) 
.050(32) 
-.028 (63) 
.077(7.0) 
.081 (1.4) 
-.006 (0.1) 
-.038 (1.7) 
.851 
135 
Ecology, 
Evolution, 
and Behav. 
.014 (3.0) 
-.039(15) 
.003 (0.9) 
.013 (4.9) 
.089 (Z9) 
-.019(2.7) 
-.014(0.4) 
.068(1.1) 
-.025(0.8) 
-.054(2.6) 
.693 
105 
Molecular and 
General Genetics 
.002 (0.8) 
-.003(1.0) 
.006 (2.4) 
.067(42) 
-.044 (6.4) 
.047(43) 
.084 (1.8) 
-.137(12) 
.002 (02) 
.864 
65 
Nenrosdence 
.031 (27) 
-.165 (1.6) 
.004 (13) 
.009 (2.7) 
-.002 (0.1) 
-.025 (32) 
.117(72) 
227 (2.0) 
-.459 (23) 
-.015 (0.4) 
.815 
78 
Physiology 
.055 (4.8) 
-.609(3.8) 
.001 (02) 
.004(23) 
.030 (3.4) 
-.019 (3.1) 
.081 (6.4) 
-.093(12) 
.062 (1.1) 
-.014(0.8) 
.834 
116 
acoeffkient has been multiplied by 1000 
where: 
FACULTY 
FACULTY2 
FULL 
RESEARCH 
PUBFAC 
GINIPUB 
crrPUB 
PHDFAC 
PHDSTU 
MEDTIME 
Total program faculty 
Total program faculty squared 
Percentage of faculty who are full professors 
Percentage of faculty with external research support (1986-92) 
Publications per faculty (1988-92) 
Gird coefficient for publications per faculty 
Citations per publication (1988-92) 
Total PhDs produced (1988-92) divided by the number of faculty 
Total PhDs produced (1988-92) divided by the number of enrolled students in 1992 
Median time to degree 
Source: Marvin L. Goldberger, Brendan A. Maher, and Pamela E. Flattau, eds. Research Doctorate Programs in the United States. 
Washington DC: National Academy Press, 1995. Appendix Tables N 
Table 2C 
1993 NRC Scholarly Quality of Program Faculty Equations: Engineering 
(absolute value t statistics) 
Field/ 
Variable 
FACULTY 
FACULTY2a 
FULL 
RESEARCH 
PUBFAC 
GINIPUB 
crrpuB 
PHDFAC 
PHDSTU 
MEDTME 
R2 
n 
Aerospace 
.093(1.7) 
-1555 (1.4) 
.008(15) 
.006(1.1) 
-.013 (02) 
.000(0.0) 
.216(2.8) 
290(35) 
.190(0.7) 
-.098 (1.6) 
756 
33 
Chemical 
.146 (4 3) 
-3.030(33) 
-.000(0.1) 
.003(13) 
.065(42) 
-.007(13) 
.088(23) 
.191(52) 
-.057(1.0) 
-.095(2.4) 
.862 
92 
Civil 
.044 (4.0) 
-266(23) 
.012 (4.0) 
.007(2.6) 
.042(1.6) 
-.019(2.6) 
.073 (1.4) 
233 (3.6) 
-.154(2.7) 
-.096(27) 
.812 
84 
Computer 
Science 
.079(3.9) 
-.669 (2.1) 
.000(12) 
.018(65) 
.014 (03) 
-.001(0.1) 
.145(3.8) 
.111 (2.1) 
.100(05) 
-.043 (1.0) 
.791 
105 
Electrical 
.055 (6.8) 
-380(42) 
.004 (1.8) 
.006(3.0) 
.062(35) 
-.001(0.1) 
.056(1.4) 
.179 (4.9) 
-.005(1.7) 
-.065(2.6) 
.867 
125 
Geoscience 
.027(3.6) 
-.107(1.7) 
.005(1.8) 
.009(35) 
.076(35) 
-.018 (3.4) 
.028(13) 
.101 (1.4) 
.111 (0.9) 
-.055(2.1) 
.854 
91 
Material 
Science 
.035 (1.9) 
-250(13) 
-.000(0.1) 
.009(23) 
.021 (Z0) 
-.017(1.7) 
.018 (1.6) 
.161 (3.7) 
306(1.8) 
-.073(1.6) 
.716 
55 
Mechanical 
.047(4.9) 
-374 (3.4) 
.007(35) 
.011 (4.7) 
.043 (2.0) 
-.015 (2.8) 
.054 (13) 
.183(4.4) 
.038(0.4) 
-.031 (1.1) 
.840 
107 
acoefficient has been multiplied by 1000 
where: 
FACULTY 
FACULTY2 
FULL 
RESEARCH 
PUBFAC 
GINIPUB 
OTPUB 
PHDFAC 
PHDSTU 
MEDTIME 
Total program faculty 
Total program faculty squared 
Percentage of faculty who are full professors 
Percentage of faculty with external research support (1986-92) 
Publications per faculty (1988-92) 
Gird coefficient for publications per faculty 
Citations per publication (1988-92) 
Total PhDs produced (1988-92) divided by the number of faculty 
Total PhDs produced (1988-92) divided by the number of enrolled students in 1992 
Median time to degree 
Source: Marvin L. Goldberger, Brendan A. Maher, and Pamela E. Flattau, eds. Research Doctorate Programs in the United States. 
Washington DC: National Academy Press, 1995. Appendix Tables K 
Table 2D 
1993 NRC Scholarly Quality of Program Faculty Equations: Physical Sciences/Mathematics 
(absolute value t statistics) 
Field/ 
Variable 
FACULTY 
FACULTY^ 
FULL 
RESEARCH 
PUBFAC 
GINIPUB 
CTTPUB 
PHDFAC 
PHDSTU 
MEDTIME 
R2 
n 
Astronomy 
.058(2.4) 
.001 (0.1) 
-.003 (0.6) 
.121 (2.8) 
-.000(0.0) 
-.026(0.2) 
322(13) 
-213 (0.4) 
-.183 (1.8) 
.765 
33 
Chemistry 
.046(32) 
-348 (1.6) 
.004 (1.8) 
.008 (5.1) 
.044 (5.2) 
-.023 (33) 
.005 (1.0) 
.181 (6.9) 
-.026(1.1) 
-.096(4.0) 
.903 
167 
Mathematics 
.034(2.9) 
-.144 (1.5) 
.004(13) 
.019(7.1) 
-.061 (1.5) 
-.009(0.8) 
-.000(0.1) 
.663(6.8) 
.131 (22) 
-.086(3.1) 
.813 
131 
Physics 
.050 (6.1) 
-271 (3.4) 
.006(23) 
.003 (1.6) 
.014 (1.0) 
-.022(2.7) 
.049 (42) 
324 (6.0) 
-263 (1.9) 
-.029(1/)) 
.851 
143 
Statistics 
.107(2.0) 
-1.607(1.4) 
.016(3.1) 
.018 (4.7) 
.065 (13) 
.005 (03) 
.002 (02) 
.056(05) 
226(0.9) 
-.038 (1.0) 
.676 
50 
acoefficient has been multiplied by 1000 
where: 
FACULTY 
FACULTY2 
FULL 
RESEARCH 
PUBFAC 
GINIPUB 
CITPUB 
PHDFAC 
PHDSTU 
MEDTIME 
Total program faculty 
Total program faculty squared 
Percentage of faculty who are full professors 
Percentage of faculty with external research support (1986-92) 
Publications per faculty (1988-92) 
Gird coefficient for publications per faculty 
Citations per publication (1988-92) 
Total PhDs produced (1988-92) divided by the number of faculty 
Total PhDs produced (1988-92) divided by the number of enrolled students in 1992 
Median time to degree 
Source: Marvin L. Goldberger, Brendan A. Maher, and Pamela E. Flattau, eds. Research Doctorate Programs in the United States. 
Washington DC: National Academy Press, 1995. Appendix Tables L 
Table 2E 
1993 NRC Scholarly Quality of Program Faculty Equations: Arts and Humanities 
(absolute value t statistics) 
Field/ 
Variable 
FACULTY 
FACULTY^ 
FULL 
RESEARCH 
AWARDF 
PHDFAC 
PHDSTU 
MEDTIME 
R2 
n 
Art History 
.164 (4.2) 
-2.157(2.1) 
.015(3.6) 
.001 (03) 
578(1.9) 
541 (3.9) 
-316(2.0) 
-.071(23) 
.839 
38 
Classics 
255(4.0) 
-5.240(2.9) 
.015(2.1) 
.040(0.9) 
586(1.4) 
562(1.9) 
260(0.4) 
.023(05) 
.748 
29 
Comp. Lit 
.024(2.4) 
.013(15) 
-.054(0.9) 
1287(1.6) 
-.001 (0.0) 
.139(05) 
-.133(1.6) 
374 
33 
English 
.066(5.0) 
-.436(27) 
.000(1.1) 
.007(05) 
2.742 (72) 
216(22) 
-.034 (02) 
-.064 (3.0) 
.684 
126 
French 
238(23) 
-6.636(2.0) 
D14(22) 
-.016(0.6) 
1.651 (2.1) 
298(15) 
-.095(0.8) 
-.052(1.1) 
.461 
33 
German 
.052(23) 
.003(0.6) 
.017(0.4) 
1.771 (1.9) 
.175(0.7) 
-.403 (1.1) 
-.124 (2.8) 
526 
33 
Linguistics 
.038(3.7) 
.011 (23) 
.028 (53) 
1579 (2.1) 
.198(2.0) 
-.668 (1.6) 
-.179(55) 
.673 
41 
Music 
.010(2.4) 
.008(1.9) 
-.004 (0.1) 
2.642(5.6) 
.021 (02) 
-.028 (0.6) 
-.153(3.6) 
545 
66 
Philosophy 
.142 (3.1) 
-2263(22) 
.010 (2.4) 
.010(1.6) 
3.076(72) 
.052 (03) 
-.137(0.4) 
-.117(2.9) 
.719 
71 
Spanish 
.082 (2.1) 
-1.114 (13) 
.010(22) 
-.006(0.1) 
2276(29) 
360(14) 
-.126(0.6) 
-.038(1.1) 
305 
52 
acoefficient has been multiplied by 1000 
where: 
FACULTY 
FACULTY2 
FULL 
RESEARCH 
AWARDF 
PHDFAC 
PHDSTU 
MEDTIME 
Total program faculty 
Total program faculty squared 
Percentage of faculty who are full professors 
Percentage of faculty with external research support (1986-92) 
Total number of awards and honors per faculty member (1986-92) 
Total PhDs produced (1988-92) divided by the number of faculty 
Total PhDs produced (1988-92) divided by the number of enrolled students in 1992 
Median time to degree 
source Marvin L. Goldberger, Brendan A. Maher, and Pamela E. Flattau, eds. Research Doctorate Programs in the United States. Washington DC: National 
Academy Press, 1995. Appendix Tables J 
Table 3 
Why Isn't Cornell Economics Ranked Among The Top 10 Departments? 
Institution 
1 Chicago 
2 Harvard 
3 MTT 
4 Stanford 
5 Princeton 
6 Yale 
7 Cal-Berkeley 
8 Pcnn 
9 Northwestern 
10 Minnesota 
11 Means of 1-5 
12 Means of 6-10 
13 Means 1-10 
14 Cornell 
IS DIFF 
16 SHARE (%) 
17 Unexplained Share 
1993 
Ratings 
4.95 
4.95 
4.93 
4.92 
4.84 
4.70 
4.55 
4.43 
4.39 
4.22 
4.92 
4.46 
4.69 
3.56 
1.13 
13% 
Tot 
Fac 
3i 
44 
28 
36 
41 
44 
41 
51 
47 
18 
36 
40 
38 
30 
8.10 
28* 
% 
Full 
81 
66 
68 
67 
61 
68 
71 
61 
68 
78 
69 
69 
69 
70 
-1.10 
0 
% 
Supp 
53 
23 
25 
28 
39 
34 
32 
45 
51 
33 
28 
39 
33 
33 
0.30 
1* 
Pub/ 
Fac 
U 
6.3 
5.0 
4.4 
3.9 
4.0 
4.2 
4.5 
4.2 
2.9 
4.6 
4.0 
4.3 
3.1 
1.18 
21* 
fllnl 
Pub 
d.7 
4.4 
7.0 
5.3 
5.3 
5.2 
4.0 
4.1 
3.6 
10.5 
5.7 
5.5 
5.6 
5.0 
0.61 
0 
Cite/ 
Pub 
16 
3.7 
4.5 
3.7 
3.3 
3.3 
3.7 
2.9 
3.4 
1.5 
4.4 
2.9 
3.7 
2.1 
1.56 
15* 
PhDs/ 
Fac 
l . < > 
2.1 
1.8 
1.4 
1.4 
1.3 
1.4 
1.8 
0.7 
1.0 
1.7 
1.2 
1.5 
0.8 
0.61 
19* 
MYD 
7.8 
6.5 
5.8 
7.1 
6.6 
8.3 
7.6 
6.9 
6.7 
7.9 
6.8 
7 
7.1 
7.4 
-0.28 
4* 
Where 
DIFF Mean value of variable for the top ten schools minus the Cornell value of the 
differential 
SHARE Percentage of DIFF attributable to difference in the variable calculated as 100 times 
coef.*(X - XculAY - Ycu) where coef. is the regression coefficient of the characteristic. 
X is the mean for the top ten institutions, Xcu is the Cornell value for the same 
characteristic, Y is the mean quality rating of the top ten institutions and Ycu is the 
Cornell quality rating. The calculation of the share attributable to differences in 
faculty size generalized the formula to take account of the fact that faculty size 
appears in the model in both linear and quadratic forms in many fields. 
and 
* SHARE calculation based on coefficient that is statistically significantly different 
from zero at the .05 level of significance two tail test. 
Appendix Table 1 
1993 NRC Scholarly Quality of Program 
Faculty Equation for Economics: Logit Modela 
(absolute value t statistics) 
FACULTY 
FACUUmb 
FULLb 
RESEARCHb 
PUBFAC 
GINIPUBb 
CITPUB 
PHDFAC 
PHDSTU 
MEDTIME 
.119 (4.7) 
-1.281 (3.6) 
3.197(0.7) 
9.816(1.8) 
.283(5.4) 
-3.653(0.5) 
.140(3.4) 
.553(7.4) 
-.108(1.6) 
-.201(4.5) 
.838 
105 
a The dependent variable is log(Ri/(5-Ri)) 
b The coefficient has been multiplied by 1000. 
See table 2A for variable definitions 
R2 
n 
Appendix Table 2 
Why Isn't Cornell Economics Ranked Among The Top 10 Departments? 
1993 
Institution log(R/(5-R)) Ratings 
1 Chicago 4.60 4.95 
2 Harvard 4.60 4.95 
3 MIT 4.25 4.93 
4 Stanford 4.12 4.92 
5 Princeton 3.41 4.84 
6 Yale 2.75 4.7 
7 Cal-Berkeley 2.31 4.55 
8 Penn 2.05 4.43 
9 Northwestern 1.97 4.39 
10 Minnesota 1.69 4.22 
11 Means of 1-5 4.12 4.92 
12 Means of 6-10 1.99 4.4 
13 Means of 1-10 2.72 4.69 
14 Cornell 0.91 3.56 
University 
15 DIFF 1.81 1.13 
16 SHARE (%) 
17 Unexplained 30% 
Share 
tot 
Fac 
31 
44 
28 
36 
41 
44 
41 
51 
47 
18 
36 
39.25 
38.1 
30 
8.1 
17* 
Full 
81 
66 
68 
67 
61 
68 
71 
61 
68 
78 
68.6 
69.5 
68.9 
70 
-1.1 
0 
Supp 
23 
23 
25 
28 
39 
34 
32 
45 
51 
33 
27.6 
40.25 
33.3 
33 
0.3 
0 
Pub/ 
Fac 
3.4 
6.3 
5 
4.4 
3.9 
4 
4.2 
4.5 
4.2 
2.9 
4.6 
3.95 
4.28 
3.1 
1.18 
18* 
Gini 
Pub 
6.7 
4.4 
7 
5.3 
53 
5.2 
4 
4.1 
3.6 
10.5 
5.74 
5.55 
5.61 
5 
0.61 
0 
CW 
Pub 
7 
3.7 
4.5 
3.7 
3.3 
3.3 
3.7 
2.9 
3.4 
1.5 
4.44 
2.88 
3.7 
2.1 
1.6 
12* 
Phbs/ 
Fac 
1.6 
2.1 
1.8 
1.4 
1.4 
1.3 
1.4 
1.8 
0.7 
1 
1.66 
1.23 
1.45 
0.8 
0.65 
20* 
MYD 
7.8 
6.5 
5.8 
7.1 
6.6 
8.3 
7.6 
6.9 
6.7 
7.9 
6.76 
7.28 
7.12 
7.4 
-0.28 
3* 
Where 
DIFF Mean value of variable for the top ten schools minus the Cornell value of the 
differential 
SHARE Share of DIFF attributable to difference in the variable calculated as 
coef.*(X - XcuVtY - Ycu) where coef. is the regression coefficient of the 
characteristic, X is the mean for the top ten institutions, X ^ is the Cornell value 
for the same characteristic, Y is the mean quality rating of the top ten 
institutions and Ycu is the Cornell quality rating. 
and 
* SHARE calculation based on coefficient that is statistically significantly 
different from zero at the .05 level of significance two tail test. 
